

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

16223

bolled down, comes to about the following:

First, many opponents of this treaty do not trust the Russians. I think we could pretty well agree on that.

Not only do they not trust the Russians, but some of them do not trust even our own scientists—I mean, their judgment.

Now it seems we do not even trust the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Apparently we do not trust the President. I say this because the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President's Science Advisory Committee, as well as the leading scientists of this country—at least most of them—support this treaty.

If we cannot trust anybody, perhaps we ought not to have a treaty. Perhaps we ought not to have hearings. Whom can we trust?

Two Presidents have recommended this treaty. Two Secretaries of Defense, two Secretaries of State, and two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended it. It seems to me we must trust them.

Mr. THURMOND. In closing, Mr. President—

Mr. SMATHERS. I thank the able Senator from Minnesota. Then I will yield to the Senator from South Carolina. I am happy to hear the Senator from South Carolina say "in closing."

The point is that there must be someone whom we can believe. The Senator from Minnesota has outlined all the people who are for the treaty. The Senator from South Carolina can outline all those who are against it. Every man has a choice.

The Senator from South Carolina chooses to believe a certain group who have some doubts about the treaty. That is his right. That is his privilege. We respect him in that right. The Senator from South Carolina will not convince me. Certainly he will not be able to convince the Senator from Minnesota. I doubt that he will be able to convince more than a few Senators of the correctness of his position, but certainly he has a right to express it. I look forward, as I am sure other Senators do, to hearing the Senator's formal speech in this regard in the next 2 or 3 days. We will give the Senator every consideration.

But, so far as the junior Senator from Florida is concerned, I have examined the testimony. I have listened to a great deal of it. I have heard many of the arguments pro and con. There is no question in my mind. It is not even a close question. We should adopt the treaty. We should adopt the treaty overwhelmingly, because it is in the best interests of the United States, as I see it.

Now I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. In the Preparedness Subcommittee the testimony will show that the Joint Chiefs of Staff admit that the Soviets are ahead of us in high yield nuclear weapons. The testimony will also show that the Russians

are ahead of us in the development of the antiballistic missile system. In order to overcome the deficiencies in those two fields it will be necessary to test in the atmosphere. That is the only way we can do it.

We are supposed to be ahead of the Soviets in the low yield weapons tests.

I do not know what information the Senator had before the Foreign Relations Committee. I am telling the Senator what testimony was given before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. I wish the Senator would read it.

Mr. SMATHERS. I concur in the conclusion of the Foreign Relations Committee, which was written in the report. This is our conclusion. The Senator from South Carolina does not know what was said before our committee, and perhaps I do not now what was said before his committee. He can read what was said before our committee, and I can read what was said before his committee. I thought we had all the testimony. The Senator says that maybe we did not. I still think we did. But now I quote the report:

But in any case, after considering all of the testimony on this subject, the committee agrees with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in the antiballistic missile field, development of the U.S. system does not depend on atmospheric testing—

Which is just contrary to what the Senator from South Carolina just said. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not say that before our committee.

Mr. THURMOND. Some of the Joint Chiefs expressed the position that they felt we could overcome some of this advantage, but I do not think they said we could do it completely, or that we could overcome it entirely. I do not know what kind of statement the Senator has, but the Preparedness Subcommittee had it in more detail, and it is classified.

Mr. SMATHERS. The Senator understands that, even if it is classified, every Senator can read it.

Mr. THURMOND. That is correct; and I would be glad if Senators would do it. In fact, I heartily recommend this.

Mr. SMATHERS. When executive sessions were held before the Atomic Energy Joint Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee—

Mr. HUMPHREY. And the Armed Services Committee—

Mr. SMATHERS. And the Armed Services Committee—we thought we really were getting all the testimony.

Mr. THURMOND. We are trying to have some of our testimony declassified. The Defense Department has refused to declassify a lot of information which will be helpful to our side. It is a very strange thing for the Department officials to do.

I read now a question asked by the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] of General LeMay on page 350 of the hearings of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The Senator from Rhode Island asked this question:

Do you see any military need for a 50- or 75-megaton bomb?

General LeMay. Yes, sir; I do. The Joint Chiefs have already recommended we go

ahead with the development work on a large yield bomb.

Senator PASTORE. Is this a new policy?

General LeMay. It is not new as far as I am concerned. I asked for, the Air Force asked for, a high-yield bomb as early as 1954.

Senator PASTORE. When you talk of 'high yield you mean over 50 megatons?

General LeMay. Yes, sir.

I bring this information up at this time because the question arose in the debate earlier today as to whether the military had asked for a high-yield bomb. I believe the Senator from Alabama indicated that it had not. We had this information in the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. We are trying to declassify it now, but are having difficulty doing so. I see that it was brought out in the Foreign Relations Committee hearings in this exchange between Senator PASTORE and General LeMay. This is a vital point, so I call it to the attention of the Senate at this time.

I read now from page 351 of the same hearings. The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] asked Admiral McDonald this question:

Admiral, could the use of very large-yield weapons put our command communications of Polaris out of commission?

Admiral McDONALD. Quite likely.

In conclusion, it is clear that the Soviets are ahead of us in high-yield weapons and in testing for the effects of high-yield weapons on our second strike systems. They are also ahead of us in the development of an antiballistic missile system. Therefore, the only way we can catch up in these crucial fields is through atmospheric testing. We can catch up partially with underground testing. We cannot completely catch up the way we should by testing in the atmosphere. We need to test in the atmosphere to determine what size bomb would knock out missiles and knock out electronic controls or guidance systems in the missiles in the silos. These tests need to be conducted in the atmosphere.

In my judgment, and that of others we shall be making a great mistake if we do not do it.

I thank the Senator for his courtesy.

Mr. SMATHERS. I am delighted to have had this discussion with the Senator from South Carolina. I would like to ask him one question in closing. When the hearings were held before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, were all the members present, or was the Senator from South Carolina there by himself?

Mr. THURMOND. Most of the members heard the testimony. They were not all there all the time, but were there most of the time.

Mr. SMATHERS. With reference to the report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, I wish to read very briefly the views of two Senators who were present and heard this testimony that apparently not enough of us heard. One of them is the Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], who said:

As a member of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee I listened to and questioned many responsible witnesses—both in

and out of Government. Most of these experts testified that our national security would be adequately protected under the terms of the treaty.

Much of this testimony was before the Foreign Relations Committee and, therefore, is not emphasized in this report.

The Senator said further:

Based on the record, I am worried about the treaty; but more worried about the possibility of an all-out nuclear exchange some day in the future.

Therefore, I plan to vote for the treaty.

This Senator sat on the same subcommittee, and listened to the same testimony that the Senator from South Carolina did, but apparently came to another conclusion.

Mr. THURMOND. He did conclude with one other Senator, to support the treaty, but the Senator from Missouri signed the majority report with five others, with only the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] declining to sign although agreeing that the facts of the subcommittee report were accurate.

Mr. SMATHERS. I shall paraphrase the views of the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], who took part in the hearings of the Preparedness Subcommittee, and who is a member of the Committee on Armed Services—I think he is the ranking minority member. He said, in effect, "I cannot come to the same conclusion my friend STROM THURMOND came to. I am going to support the treaty."

It all comes back to the same question Senators have been discussing this afternoon. The evidence is before us. A Senator can choose to believe this one or that one, and not believe 25 on the other side, or he can do anything he wishes in arriving at his own judgment; and that is what the Senator has done.

The rest of us, motivated by the same desires to serve our country, with the same degree of patriotism, who put ourselves in his class and say that we, too, love our country just as he does, have chosen to believe what we think is the preponderance of the evidence given by all the witnesses.

We think there is something beyond the mere narrow view of the military to be considered in the test ban treaty. We think the interests of this Nation and the free world can be served by adopting the treaty. That is why we are going to vote for it. The Senator is entitled to his view. We are entitled to ours. I thank the Senator.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the able and distinguished Senator. Five of the seven members of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee favored the report. The other two Senators admitted that the report was factually true, one of the two even signing the report with the rest of us. The Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] said that, to best of his knowledge, the factual data contained in the report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee is correct. The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] admitted that the facts contained in the report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee were accurately stated.

The committee stated:

From the evidence we have learned that the Soviets have overtaken and surpassed us in the design of very high-yield nuclear weapons; that they may possess knowledge of weapons effects and antiballistic missile programs superior to ours; and that under the terms of the treaty it is entirely possible that they will achieve parity with us in low yield weapon technology.

Mr. SMATHERS. I wish to finish reading that part of the report. It states:

Although we have concluded that there will be a net military disadvantage to us if the treaty is ratified, we recognize the existence of other factors which, while not within the scope of this report—

Because this is on a narrow, military basis—

are pertinent to a final judgment on the treaty.

This is the point we are making—there are other considerations besides the narrow considerations of what are military advantages. There are other considerations, even bigger considerations.

Mr. THURMOND. That is correct, but I do not consider the military disadvantages to be narrow. The effect is that one would favor the treaty if he believed the Preparedness Subcommittee's report that there were military disadvantages but believed that there would be political advantages which would offset or more than offset them.

Mr. SMATHERS. That is correct.

Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SMATHERS. I thank the Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I think it is obvious that each Senator can bring to bear on this question different witnesses who have different points of view. Again, I repeat, one has to consider the testimony in terms of the competence of the witness, of the variety of experience the witness may have had, and the knowledge he may have acquired, and his current knowledge in weaponry and in our relative strength to that of the Soviet Union.

First of all, I believe the RECORD ought to be corrected with reference to Admiral McDonald. Admiral McDonald did not testify that a big weapon could put out of commission our Polaris submarines. What he did testify was that a big underwater explosion in the megaton range near a Polaris submarine would put that submarine out of commission. He testified at page 396 of the hearings with respect to the whole system, and his testimony is to the effect that the big weapon would not put out our communications system, which is the heart of the Polaris system. We have duplicate systems. We have ways of putting in extra protection. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point the marked portion of the testimony of Admiral McDonald.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Admiral McDONALD. I believe the question was what impact would it have; would it

have an adverse impact upon the communications of the Polaris submarine.

My answer was—

Senator PASTORE. With the permission of Mr. KUCHEL, I think we ought to read General Taylor's answer to that question. That is the reason I asked it so that you would have the full context of it.

General TAYLOR. Admiral McDonald really should answer the question. I would say from what I know we have so many duplicating pairs for communications that we would have no problem communicating with any one of our weapons systems or the essential elements of those systems, although, obviously, some fraction might be lost.

Admiral McDONALD. May I go ahead, sir?

Senator PASTORE. Yes.

Admiral McDONALD. When the question was asked this morning my immediate thought was the effect that a megaton bomb would have upon the communications system of the submarine were the bomb applied to the submarine, in other words, a megaton underwater burst near the submarine, and that is the reason I said "Quite likely." I had studied earlier this morning something that Senator ANDERSON had worked up because of a question that was asked him in the spring [deleted].

Now, if we are speaking, as I understand now, of the communications, not of the submarine but to the submarine from the shore, I doubt very much if it would adversely affect them, because we do have duplicating systems [deleted] I realize that there are some who ask what will happen if these megaton bombs create a communications blackout?

Well, I don't know, and I am not certain that our scientists know positively that such a thing will happen.

But if it does, I think it would have less effect upon the Polaris system than any other because the Polaris system does not have to be as immediately responsive.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, we should also note, with reference to the so-called high yield big weapon, that the decision was conscientiously made by our scientists and military men not to go in for the big weapon, even though the Air Force favored it.

We have exploded rather large bombs. Our scientists have said that without further testing of 50 or 60 megaton bombs, we have knowledge on that type of weaponry. At pages 10 and 11 of the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations there is this statement with respect to our decision to build smaller weapons:

This decision has accounted in large part for the superiority of the U.S. forces. As Secretary of Defense McNamara stated:

"Our high yield-to-weight ratio in the relevant range has facilitated the development of more powerful warheads for Minuteman and Polaris without concomitant increase in vehicle size or decrease in range. It is because of this that the United States has had the advantage over the Soviets of being able to deploy large numbers of hardened and dispersed Minuteman missiles and a large number of long-range, sub-launched Polaris missiles. And U.S. superiority in the lower ranges facilitates further development of relatively small warheads which would be used to assure penetration by saturation of sophisticated and very elaborate ballistic missile defenses."

The report continues:

Even Dr. Edward Teller, a critic of the treaty, recently commented:

"It is not clear to me that these very big yields will result in a substantial advantage for the Russians * * *. In evaluating the